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The Law as a Command in the Pure Theory 
of Law and Technical Theory of Jurisprudence 
1. Pure Theory of Law 
In realistic terms, what the public conceives as lawful or unlawful is almost changing day 
in day out. Legal rules, too, are changing swiftly nowadays; what was still effective law 
yesterday may well have lost its validity by now. Court ruling, or judicial practice in general, 
also tends to be modified: judgment of yesterday are unlike those of today which, in turn, 
may be unlike those of tomorrow. In practical law, then, change is the most general feature. 
Scientific views concerning law are changing as well. Especially mutable are those ideas 
of a scientific hue that intend to be actively involved in the processes of practice, ie., those 
that strive to alter people's concept of lawfulness and unlawfulness, that aspire to alter the 
legal norm, judicial rulings and legal practice in general. By implication, then, these notions 
aim at stimulating changes even further which do exist in practice after all. 
At the same time, law as a system of norms continuously exists. The living together of 
human beings is characterized by the fact that their mutual behavior is regulated. The living 
together of individuals, in itself a biological phenomenon, becomes a social phenomenon by 
the very fact of being regulated. Society is ordered living together, or society is the ordering 
of the living together of individuals. To the individual the order appears as a complex of 
rules that determinate how the individual ought to behave in relation to other individuals. 
Such rules are called norms.1 
The various types of the social order constitute law as well as operate it. For it is undo-
ubtedly a different system of ideas that realizes as a social order, eg., monarchy or republic, 
liberalism or dictatorship, still each of these shares a common feature, the regulatedness of 
social relations, the legal regulation. On the bases of the theoretically deducible common 
properties of regulatedness we may presumably reach a universal essence. If in the course 
of this inquiry regulatedness is sought from the premise of positive law and it is assumed that 
in the interest of the social order certain social conditions are regulated by positive law, 
this may be construed in diverse ways. 
The exploration of positive law is the focus of, eg., J. Austin's analytical theory of law,2 
the Scandinavian legal realism,3 Vishinsky's socialist-normativism,4 and plenty of other 
trends, primarily Hans Kelsen's pure theory of law. The theoretical trends scrutinizing posi-
tive law from diverse aspects are all to outline the universal nature of law — with different 
methods. The most homogeneous version of coherent analyses that can be abstracted from 
the real norms — as par excellence normativism — is the pure theory of law. 
1 H. Kelsen: The law as a specific social technique. In: What is Justice. Law and Politics in the 
Mirror of Science. Collected essays by H. Kelsen. University of California Press, 1971. p. 231. 
2 J. Austin: The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Oxford, 1954. 
3 See, for example, A. Hagerstrom: Inquiries into Nature of Law and Morals, 1953., K. Olivec-
rona: Law as Fact. 1939., K. Olivecrona: The Imperative Element of Law. Rutgers Law Rewiew, 
1964. 18., A. Ross: Towards a Realistic Jurisprudence. 1946., A. Ross: On Law and Justice. 1958., 
A. V. Lundstedt: Legal Thinking Revised, 1956,. F. Castberg: Problems of Legal Philosophy. 1957. 
4 А. Я. Вышинский: Вопросы теории государства и права. Москва, 1949. 
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„The Pure Theory of Law is a theory of positive law — a general theory of law, not a presen-
tation or interpretation of a special legal order. From a comparison of all phenomena which 
go under the name of law, it seeks to discover the nature of law itself, to determine its struc-
ture and its typical forms, independent of the changing content which it exhibits at dif-
ferent times and among different peoples. In this manner it derives the fundamental principles 
by means of which any legal order can be comprehended. As a theory, its sole purpose is to 
know its subject. It answers the question of what the law is, not what it ought to be. The 
latter question is one of politics, while the pure theory of law is science. 
It is called „pure" because it seeks to preclude from the cognition of positive law all 
elements foreign thereto. The limits of this subject and its cognition must be clearly fixed 
in two directions: the specific science of law, the discipline usually called jurisprudence, 
must be distinguished from the philosophy of justice, on the one hand, and from sociology, 
or cognition of social reality, on the other. 
To free the concept of law from the idea of justice is difficult, because they are constantly 
confused both in political thought and in general speech, and because this confusion corres-
pounds to the tendency to let positive law appear as just. In view of this tendency, the effort 
to deal with law and justice as two different problems falls under the suspicion of dismissing 
the requirement that positive law should be just. But the Pure Theory of Law simply declares 
itself incompetent to answer either the question whether a given law is just or not, or the 
more fundamental question of what constitutes justice. The Pure Theory of Law — a scien-
ce — cannot answer these questions because they cannot be answered scientifically at all."5 
Positive law, which is the object of the Pure Theory of Law, is an order by which hu-
man conduct is regulated in a specific way. The regulation is accomplished by provisions 
which set forth how men ought to behave. Such provisions are norms.6 In this sense, the 
legal norm refers to the conduct of two entities: the subject of legal relation, ie. the citizen, 
against whose delict the coercive measure of the legal sanction is directed; and the organ 
that is to apply the coercive measure to the delict.7 
Such a way the element of coercion is an essential characteristic of the law. But if we 
say that a legal norm "exists" we mean that a norm is valid. To say that a norm is valid for 
an individual means that the individual ought to conduct himself as the norm prescribes. 
A law system of valid norms consists of "ought" propositions, statements, and not in which 
an "is", is expressed.8 The validity of the norm may be expressed by saying: something ought 
to be or ought not to be, something ought to be done or ought not to be done. If the specific 
existence of the norm is identified with its validity, then by this a specific mode is meant in 
which the norm — unlike the existence of natural facts — is given.9 
The norm cannot be logically deduced from the "is" (Sein) rule. From the fact that 
something is or happens, it does not logically follow that it (or something else) ought to be 
or ought to happen.10 An isolated legal norm may be "valid" even if it does not prove ef-
fective in every single case.11 
The reason for the validity of a norm supplies the answer to the question: why ought 
6 H. Kelsen: The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence. In: What is Justice, 
ibid. p. 266. Theory of H. Kelsen, first in Hungarian language, see, Kelsen Hans : Az àllamelmélet 
alapvonalai (The Outlines of Theory of State). Transi. Prof. Gyula Moor. Szeged, 1927. pp. 90. 
6 H. Kelsen: The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, ibid. p. 267. 
7 H. Kelsen: ibid. p. 275. 
8 H. Kelsen: ibid. p. 268. 
8 H. Kelsen: Reine Rechtslehre. Wien, 1960. p. 10. 
10 H. Kelsen: Value Judgments in the Science of Law. In: What is Justice, ibid. p. 218. 
11 H. Kelsen: ibid. p. 225. 
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one to behave as the norm prescribes? Because the "validity" of a norm is its specific mode of 
existence, the reason for the validity of a norm is always another norm, never a fact.12 
"The facts which condition the existence of a legal norm — the presence of a norm-creat-
ing fact and the absence of the norm — annulling fact — are therefore not the ground for the 
existence of the norm. They are a condition sine qua non but not a conditio per quam.13 
The facts — either those of norm-creation or those of judicial practice — are, indeed, 
not to be annulled. In Kelsen's view the facts take on importance in a divergent aspect of 
interpretation: in judging the efficacy of the law, which is the domain of sociology. Normative 
jurisprudence deals with the validity of the law: sociological jurisprudence with its efficacy; 
but just as validity and efficacy are two different aspects of the law that must be kept clearly 
apart, yet which stand in a definite relation to each other, so there exists between normative 
and sociological jurisprudence, despite the difference in the direction of their cognitions, a 
considerable connention.14 
In addition, normative jurisprudence and sociological jurisprudence may stand in a 
complementary relation to each other. The Pure Theory of Law by no means denies the 
validity of such sociological jursprudence. Sociological jurisprudence stands side by side with 
normative jurisprudence; neither is able to replace the other because each deals with dif-
ferent problems.15 
For Kelsen, pure information about legal prescriptions must be separated from intrusive 
value judgments of all kinds. Despite the obscurities of this esoteric language, Kelsen is the 
true friend of the practitioner who wants to be called on to describe the law and nothing 
but the law in office hours.16 
In the Pure Theory of Law — just as in sociological jurisprudence or in Hart's theory 
of obligation17 —, the technique of law does not figure as a separate area of interpretation, 
let alone as an aspect for theory modeling. In other words: the technical solutions, although 
by no means indifferent from the aspect of theoretical tenets, do not appear determinant. 
At a time when Kelsen had already finished his oeuvre, Herbert Simon referred to a contin-
gent interpretation, not expressly in terms of the law, that in the course of societal action 
it is not merely the means that should be found for the goals of society, but rather it is the 
means existing in a given situation that mark out the goals of society.18 
It is possible that at a cursory look this interpolation seems meaningless, as the Pure 
Theory of Law does not deem the law a means of society and sociological jurisprudence is 
less inclined to grasp the bases of the efficacy of law in its normative and technical charac-
teristics. The goal that is deducible from the means or following from them is for H. Simon 
too the manifestation of observation and experience: it is rather an empirical truth than a 
theoretical thesis. However, if the provisions of law direct human conduct,19 then it is to be 
presumed that the technical characteristics, the functioning mechanism should scarcely be 
considered as unimportant. Rather, it can even be an aspect for system modeling; of course, 
the question is on what grounds. 
12 H. Kelsen: ibid. pp. 218—219. 
13 H. Kelsen: ibid. p. 219. 
14 H. Kelsen: The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, ibid. pp. 269—270. 
15 H. Kelsen: ibid. p. 269. 
16 J. W. Harris: Legal Philosophies. London, 1980. p. 3. 
17 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law. Oxford, 1961. 
18 H. Simon: From Substantive to Procedural Rationality. 1978. 
19 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law. p. 39. 
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2. On the interpretability of law 
In people's view, law can be interpreted in terms of what they think to be a legal rule, 
then in terms of what is the meaning of a lawfully constituted legal norm, then with what 
content of meaning the courts and other official law—applying organs apply the legal rules as 
well as from several other professional aspects. 
The result — if we wish to express the law — depends in a large measure on in what 
kind of range of interpretation we have tried to define the law. 
Supposedly, the operativeness of legal system is a fact at all times, which, supposedly, 
may also be measured by setting out from the conclusion of legal cases and lawsuits. Much 
less definable is the number of cases in which people behaved in a manner held to be lawful, 
when the concrete situations did not come up for trial or failed to involve the authorities 
and courts. These cases, regarded as ones passing through a regular procedure, are not re-
corded in any statistical chart whatsoever. In every modern state there are case-statistics, 
court-statistics, criminological statistics and so forth. However, the data of these are in-
variably made up of the functioning of authorities, of what these perceive. People do not 
register into how many and what kind of legal relationships they have entered with one 
another, and how many times was their behavior lawful and how many times unlawful. 
These cases, therefore, cannot be summed up, nor can they be evaluated. The cases that can 
be handled as data and evaluated origina tefrom law-suits and affairs of the courts, the law — 
applying organs, the administrative bodies etc. 
The cases known to the courts, the authorities and the administrative bodies are facts 
as much as those we cannot become familiar with in this manner. The cases as existing 
facts, and of these all that can be evaluated from the law-applying procedures with a techni-
cal method, constitute two fields as far as the law is concerned: 
— cases that can be factually evaluated (these can be learned from the files of judiciary 
and other law-applying bodies), 
— cases that cannot be factually evaluated (to know these in profundity no practical 
method exists). 
In the case of law there is a possibility primarily for cases that may be contested, that 
have become debatable, cases presumably involving a violation of law as well as ones that 
cannot be effected without the participation of an administrative body. On the number of 
cases listed in the second field we have no data at all. If we have data on the facts of the first 
field, we are not to infer the second field from these. So if, for instance, the court tried a thous-
and cases in a month which were concerned with sales, we should refrain from deducing 
from this the number of sales contract within the competence of the court in the same period. 
And this also applies to so strictly — controlled a theme as delict: from the number of cri-
mes that become known to the authorities we should not extrapolate the number of crimes 
actually committed. We need not justify that the number of cases is a far too general indi-
cator, scarcely illustrative of anything, if we wish to establish something concerning the 
content of the rule. 
If the functioning of the law manifests itself in cases, then the processing of cases that 
can be evaluated as well as their analysis and measuring, although feasible in theory, still is 
extremely relative in practice. Indeed, it is pragmatically possible to evaluate and measure only 
cases that are, as compared to the legal norm, disputable, contrary to law, perverted or 
wrong without the participation of the administrative bodies. And if we consider here also 
that in a substantial portion of cases the client can initiate proceedings — legal proceedings 
start when the plaintiff of his own free will commences an action, and this subjective decision 
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usually stems not from the motivation of positive law, but of the generally accepted law20 
— then suffice it to point out that the measurability of cases with legal relevance is extremely 
relative, fuzzy and of slight factual value. 
Nevertheless the functioning of the law is a fact, which is realistic within a definite 
duration and a definite space-relation. Law in general and law in function actually — if seen 
from a variety of theoretical considerations — may be right or wrong, just and unjust, moral 
and amoral, necessary and unnecessary for society, imperative or incidental. These are 
aspects for principles. They can express the norm's sociability, the law's evolution and in-
volution and other things. These are suppositions of principle, as there are other suppositions 
of principle, which, no matter how much factual content they have, are still suppositions. 
And a supposition can be substituted for by another: the fact — which defies any close 
definition — may be substituted for by a supposition from outset. This would lead us the 
Pure Theory of Law. In this, because of its normativistic interpretation, the facts are neutral 
from the aspect of theory-creation: they are irrelevant for the validity of the legal norm. 
According to Kelsen, if a norm exists as law, then it is valid.21 The fact of the norm is : value 
as legal value. The law constitutes its value by being a norm.22 The fact of the norm is of 
course neither that of legislation, nor that of jurisdiction, nor that of a legally significant 
act of the subject of law. 
The intepretation of Technical Theory of Jurisprudence — although it is one of the 
premises of Kelsen's normativism — is not identical with this. Here the act is a fact: the 
act of legislator, law-applier, and of the subject entering into relation with the law. Not bec-
ause this could be defined exactly at present, but because, at least in principle, it can be 
handled as a fact. It regards as crucial criterion the dimension of time and space, as coordina-
tes of factualness. Functioning and the capacity for functioning cannot be interpreted without 
these. 
The expressible boundary of this may be realized by the practical validation of positive 
law. Thus, however, the problematics of the validity of the law turns into the validation and 
efficacy of the law. This transition from the regularities of the norm is a switch over to the 
regularities of the validity of the norm: a switch over from the theses of the norm to the 
postulation, application and practical validation of the norm. Factually this is a translocation, 
and temporally an asynchronity. It can also be interpreted as a conversion from the regulari-
ties of the norm into those of the efficacy of the norm, ie., a transition from a "pure theory 
of law" into a "non-pure" or mixed or, if you like, a "dirty theory of law", into the theory 
of application and practical functioning. 
In the interpreation of the pure theory of law as well as in the conception of dogmatics 
of jurisprudence, the functioning and prevailing of the law is essentially not a legal-normative 
but a political and sociological phenomenon: the applied legal norm, then, is not a pure legal 
norm. Applied law is metajuristic: it may be good sociology, policy, psychology or good ad-
ministration, but it is not necessarily good legal dogmatics or legal normatics. What is 
"pure" in a normative sense would not retain this property in the course of the application 
of law. Applied law and the application of law can be deduced by no means only from pre-
mises of a "pure" theory of law or of legal dogmatics. The actually functioning law consists 
not only of legal postulates. Law is not solely comprised of rules. Rules are part of law. But 
in hard cases, judges are guided to their decisions by standards which are not legal norms. 
Such standards include policies and principles. A policy is that kind of standard that sets 
20 Compare Gy. Antalffy—A. Tamás : The State and law-making. Acta Universitatis Szegedien-
sis de Attila József Nominatae. Acta Juridica et Politica. Tom. XXXIII. Fasc. 1. Szeged, 1985. 
p. 32. 
21 Compare H. Kelsen: General Theory of Law and State. Cambridge, 1949. p. 113. 
22 H. Kelsen: Reine Rechtslehre. p. 67. 
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out a community goal, generally an improvement in some economic, political or social 
feature of the community's life; for example, the policy that automobile accidents are to be 
decreased. A principle is a standard to be observed because it is a requirement of justice or 
fairness or some other dimensions of morality; for example, "no man may profit by his own 
wrong".23 
The legal norm necessarily prevails by stepping out of its frameworks posited by legis-
lation. The practical application of the legal norm engenders those segments of interpretation 
in the course of which legal regulation may be grasped as a programing or conditioning of 
society,24 its normative analysis or even a specific algorithm-theory of it. The norm as rule 
standard and its judicial practice full with non-rule standards are together always in comple-
mentary relation. So the application of law is not a legal-normative regularity because the 
legal norm can be applied in this manner too, but because it is actually applied in this manner, 
and this is factual.25 The fact is real, yet in itself it is still not science. 
Scientific tenets can be constructed as much from abstract principles as from the cont-
racted explication of the facts of reality. A priori, neither has an advantage over the other. 
If some version of jurisprudence can be verified by deduction from principles, then all versions 
that directly stem from facts are just as much verifiable. Pragmatically no exclusive grounds 
exist for either the "pure" or the "non-pure", that is, applied law. It is a separate question 
that these could well be self-contained areas of interpretation for a scientific proposition. 
Of course, a scientific proposition is not an arbitrary thing which, say, arises in the 
spirit of varietas delectat. A scientific proposition requires the scrutiny of the objects of the 
domain at issue, according to necessity both subjective and objective.25 The former can at 
best lead to a representation that in what manner can the external order and ranking be 
expressed. Inasmuch as the objective necessity of the object resides in its logico-metaphysical 
nature, the scientific closeness or even the seriousness of the scrutiny would diminish accord-
ingly in the inquiry of insulated phenomena, and this leads to the acceptance of logico-
interpretational ranges. 
On this basis one could encounter two contrasting treatments. One of these aspires to 
make jurisprudence draw its rationality from what already exists: from the codified legal 
rules and from the practice of their application, and would set the principles deducible 
from these as the general principles of law. 
The other approach builds directly upon principles which speak in generalities about 
the rightful and the just, about the valuable and worthless for society. This would create a 
theory — the abstract philosophy of law — that does not directly affect the legal norm in 
its particularity, only in its generality, ie., according to principles. Such theories may offer 
a variety of lessons, still these do lead to one-sided postulation. On the one hand, the inter-
pretation of the dogmatic and pure theory of law comprises the precondition that it is ca-
pable of impeccably determine the pure criteria of law,, which, as compared to the actual 
validity of law, constitute after all only a narrower terrain. On the other hand, law — with-
out normative and dogmatic restrictions — becomes immoderate and arbitrary, and it 
will indeed be exclusively a matter of the manifestation in form what is law and what is not. 
Theoretical explications, therefore, are usually allied with facts or principles. The num-
ber of explications is arbitrary. One further common feature of them is that between facts 
and principles they aspire now toward coherence, now toward composition. These are com-
23 R. M. Dworkin: Taking Rights Seriously. 1978. p. 22. 
24 Compare for example, E. A. Ross: The System of Social Control. In: American Social 
Thought. New York, 1961. pp. 151—155. 
25 Compare Vogel: Der Skandinavische Rechtsrealismus. Arbeiten zur Rechtsvergleichung 
56, Frankfurt am Maine. 1972. 
26 G. W. F. Hegel: Vorlesungen fiber die Aesthetik. Erster .Band, Stuttgart, 1953. pp. 32—33. 
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binations as compared to the question whether the point of departure is primarily made up 
of abstract principles or empirical facts. 
In terms of methodology, this is a fundamental question. In several respects this de-
pends on the choice of paradigm in which — as Thomas S. Kuhn in his work "The Structure 
of Scientific Revolution" puts it — the confidence in the new scheme and paradigm is by 
no means irrelevant.27 
However, there is no absolutely invariant — untainted by theory — principle of obser-
vation.28 The theory can be comprehended as classes of empirical and analytical compo-
nents, but there is not a logically marked difference between these. On each plane of the ac-
quisition of knowledge a theory comes about on the basis of which predicate-classes can 
be formed,29 with identical extensions in them. Nevertheless, the meaning of scientific pre-
dicates and their empirical content are discernible30. We may even say that for professional 
lawyers one single paradigm-system is given; they are working within the same paradigm, 
so pragmatically the choice of paradigm is irrelevant. 
The precondition of the stability of the legal rule would attach the choice of paradigm 
to social-historical landmarks; this however is not necessarily true. Apart from the most 
fundamental legal facts — the axioms of law — almost everything is subject to change by 
sequences. At the same time, any one modification of rule rarely results in the revision of 
basic tenets and axioms. 
The ascertainment of these can be factually interpreted on the bases of experience, 
although the theories and regularities might be labeled as subjective if not gained with a 
measuring method.31 At present, the possibility of measuring is restricted in the realm of 
law. What can actually be measured are mostly cases of violations of law. 
However, this does not imply that opportunities for getting to know the functioning 
are out of the question here. For if something is a fact, then it is real even though no reliable 
measuring methods are at our disposal today for measuring it. In the interpretation of 
facts realness and verifiability may in a peculiar way be complemented by falsification; 
that is, something which cannot be critically scrutinized does not deserve the attention 
of science, ie., it is most likely false. Yet it is worthy of our serious attention or even of our 
belief, with reservation though.32 
As compared to these, the value of theories lies not in their veracity but in their capacity 
for functioning: and this is true for the theories of law as well. First of all, the theory is a 
hypothesis and not a conclusion. Secondly, it contains generally accepted tenets — just as 
the legal norm — which realistically have no specific, absolute truth-content. The norm — as 
Kelsen puts it — is neither true nor false, but it is either valid or invalid. There is no parallel 
or analogue whatever between the truth of the tenet and the validity of the norm.33 
In K. Popper's view the dynamism of society is an interaction between logic-imbued 
theory and irrationalized practice.34 Law is not really rationality, points out Gottfried Dietze, 
27 T. S. Kuhn: The Structure of Scientific Revolution. Chicago, 1970. p. 206. 
28 J. Giedymin: The Paradox of Meaning Variance. Britisch Journal of Phil. Sei. 21. 1970. 
29 See M. Hesse: A Self-correcting Observation Language. In: Logic, Methodology and Philo-
sophy of Science. Amsterdam, 1968., M. Hesse : Tje Structure of Scientific Inference. London, 1974. 
30 Compare for example, J. Leplin: Reference and Scientific Realism. Stud. Hist. Phil. Sei. 
10., 1979. 4., R. Carnap: Meaning and Necessity. Chicago, 1956. 
31 See R. Carnap: The Methodological Character of Theoretical Terms. In: Minnesota Studies, 
I. Minneapolis, 1956. 
32 K. R. Popper: Truth, Rationality and the Growth of Knowledge. In: Conjectures and Refu-
tations. London, 1963., K. R., Popper: Objective Knowledge. Oxford, 1972. 
33 H. Kelsen: Die Grundlage der Naturrechtslehre, österreichische Zeitscrift für öffentliches 
Recht. No. 1—2. 1964. p. 2. 
34 K. Popper: Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford, 1972. 
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law as men recognize or make it, be it unaffected or affected by desire, is thus not something 
merely rational. The saying, error multiplex, Veritas una, could be complemented by the 
dictum, lex multiplex, ratio una. We know the law, but we are unable to discern the ultima 
ratio. This applies to all types of law, divine or natural, common or customary, written or 
codified.35 
3. The Technical Theory of Jurisprudence 
For the sake of analogy, proceeding at first along a Kelsenian argumentation, we may 
state that the Technical Theory of Jurisprudence is the theory of the functioning of positive 
law. Thus, it is a general theory of law and not the demonstration or interpretation of some 
kind of specific legal order. By comparing all phenomena labeled with the name of law, it 
attempts to detect the nature of the actually prevailing law, to determine the regularities 
of its functioning, the essence of its technology, with especial regard for those lasting forms 
as well as changing contents that might appear as its manifestation in various times and 
in various peoples. 
Here, too, the point of departure is strictly the realm of positive law. The technical 
theory of jurisprudence, then, establishes those basic principles by means of which the 
functioning of any legal order is perceivable. As a theory, its sole objective is merely the 
cognizance of its object. It answers the question, what is the actually functioning law, and 
not what it might be, or what it ought to be. This latter question obviously belongs to the 
province of social philosophy and practical policy; the technical theory of jurisprudence, 
by contrast, is a theoretical science with realistic-pragmatic grounds. 
The technical theory of jurisprudence is not a "pure" theory of law by any means. All 
those elements that play a role in the functioning of positive law are not irrelevant for this 
theory. The regularity of the practical functioning of law is a technique, an applied practical 
solution. To ascertain and generalize the regularities of this technique constitutes the tech-
nical theory of jurisprudence.36 
Kelsen takes the view that positive law is a compulsory order the norms of which are 
made up of volitional acts of human beings — ie., customs created by acts of legislative, 
judiciary and administrative bodies or human beings. And as the norms of positive law are 
made up of volitional acts of human beings, these norms can be altered arbitrarily: they 
differ from one another according to ages and peoples.37 
If this is true — and the human experience tends to make it plausible — then the pri-
mary features of law and especially those of the functioning of law overwhelmingly originate 
from human volition, and their explanation in many an area must ultimately be traced from 
this. 
Will, direction, normalization: these are interlinking and entwining concepts. Seen 
from this angle, the law is a regular will generally acknowledged or the making regular of 
will. 
That the will in what form is regular is posited by the pure theory of law. 
Why and to what degree the will strives for regularities, is posited by the sociology of 
law. 
35 G. Dietze: The Limited Rationality of Law. In: Rational Decision. Nomos, VII. New York, 
1964. p. 69. 
86 See A. Tamás: Vázlat a jogról mint sajátos társadalmi technikáról (Outlines of Law as a 
Specific Social Technique) Jogtudományi Közlöny, XXXVIII. 1983. No. 8., Gy. Antal ffy—A. Tamás: 
The State and law-making, ibid. 
37 H. Kelsen: Positivisme juridique et doctrine du droit naturel. In: Mélanges en'l honneur de 
Jean Dabin, 1963. p. 141. 
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How the will becomes regularity, is posited by the technical theory of jurisprudence. 
This latter does not delimit itself rigorously from any other theory: it is eclectic like reality. 
It holds the facts stronger than the speculative or abstract principles. As opposed to any 
theoretically constructed homogenity, it prefers the real myriad of phenomena which still 
does allow for the prevailing practical composition to be generalized in theory. 
According to this, the general methodological theses that can be related to the legal order 
as rule-standards are as follows: 
— The law can be constructed as a specific social technique. In this respect the paramount 
theoretical interpretability of law is that it is a functioning social system of rule-standards. 
The configuration to be highlighted for inquiry in the first place is functioning. Any thesis 
of a legal character which fails to function in reality can only be interpreted as a law-related 
principle or legal ideology. 
— The law as a system of norms is an induced form. In this capacity as a departure 
of normativity, it is perforce a hypothesis. This shows itself best in legislation as an operation 
of the technology triggering a process. At the creation of the legal norm, the validity and 
functioning of the norm is pure assumption. 
— The general basis of the functioning of law is the credibility of its hypotheses, 
in a given case independently of the Tightness, justness, unjustness etc. that may be associated 
with it, which are and will remain areas of interpretation. 
— The actual functioning of law can be factually interpreted, irrespective of the fact 
that only data on legal conflict-situations are at our disposal. The law as a fact: this is prac-
tice. The law as a fact can be interpreted in time and space. The practice can be appropriately 
typified by the creation of the legal norm and the law case. A principal technological feature 
of the legal norm is that it can be multiplied to various kinds of law cases. A principal feature 
of the law cases is that they are unique and irreversible. 
— The law as a norm — it is by necessity a defined form. It is indifferent from this 
regard that it is costumary law or codified law. 
— Modern law — or the law functioning in the modern political state — is defined 
first and foremost by the state-legislative power, thus it constitutes one single paradigm-
system. 
— Modern law as a system of rule-standards primarily defined by legislation is based 
on one single axiom-system. 
— In the designation of the generally known or unknown parameters of law as well 
as in the choice of paradigm the governing bodies play a crucial role. It is in the manner of 
form and not that of content that the law delimits government. For the legislative power 
can alter the content of legal rules at any time and, hence, the change of law is linked up with 
the change of government in modern political states. This, however, involves that in the 
modern political state the legislative and executive power tend to come very close to each 
other. This modern law-creation, compared to any that prevailed before, is the most pur-
poseful, the most goal-oriented legislation that functions according to goals and builds 
in compliance with those and, thus, a constructive one. 
Legislation is closely related with the administration of justice or application of law, 
with its official and professional apparatus and its purposefulness, which would not infre-
quently step forward even as a corrector of legislation. The goal-rationality and self- con-
sciousness will increase both in the field of law-creation and in that of law-application, yet 
the finite nature of these unfolds all the more conspicuously. With this then — although 
under entirely different conditions, in a diverse way in diverse sequences — the law as a 
technique repeats itself in its model-like fashion, 
Yet the more complex the relationships of the people, the more complication is involved 
in making this expediency prevail. From the vantage of logic it might be excepted that the 
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law-creation and law-application of the modern political state is the most conscious, cent-
ralized and coherent. And this is correct in several respects. Still, having surveyed the argu-
ment, we may say, despite all notions, ideas, concepts and schemes in favor, that modern law 
is not entirely a centrally-designed order and regulation. 
The law as an actually functioning system of rules does not originate exclusively from 
a central idea, it is much rather self-generating. It generates from itself as a fact. This fact 
is the act of law-creation and the law case as an act. The imprint of a temporally earlier 
legilsative and executive will ever be left upon government and legal order, and will, among 
others, prescribe one of the finalities of the actions of government. This is a certain continuity 
in time and space, but it is not sure that it is a continuous rationality. And this applies also, 
to some degree, to earlier law cases. As opposed to this, the interpretation of modern law 
tends to argue with "rationalities". On closer inspection the majority of these appear as 
evidence or feeds on axiom-like bases. 
The interpretation of determinate character is mostly worked out in the professional 
lawyers' sphere as the interpretation of law-creation and as that of court judging or law-
application. In terms of operation, neither interprets directly principles or norms, but ex-
pounds rather situations of decision and judgments or rulings, that is, "rationalizes" by 
means of principles and norms. By means of principles like "rightness", "justness", "free-
dom", "equality before the law", "democratism", "fairness" etc. — as to the creation of 
legal norms — and by means of norms — in cases of law-application — which people presup-
pose to be right and just, which warrant equality before the law, freedom, democratism, 
which are fair and are equal to other similar principles: i.e, they are lawful. Significantly, 
these concepts, principles and norms not only hypothesize and symbolize reality in some 
manner, but the operations, the manipulation with them somehow generate it as well,28 
Or not, we may add. 
It is not at all indifferent how they generate reality, or how they fail to generate it. 
Both the principles and the norms — although with different methods — are more or less 
always defined, and in this capacity they are given to the practicing experts of law-making 
and law-application. The making of the legal norm and the passing of the law-applier's 
ruling cannot be done exclusively from principles or from legal rules codified earlier. The 
concrete practical expediency diverts legislation from the legal principles and diverts jurisdic-
tion from the legal rules. The task to be solved entails an unmasking of facts and a situation-
analysis ; there follows an interpretation bound in time and space. The content or material idea 
turns into a technical idea or principle.39 In this the exactitude cannot be either verified or 
falsified, that is, it cannot be statisfactorily expressed in a positivistic way. The technical 
solution of the operation can be at least as purely logic as purely empiric. This latter — if 
Popper is right — is non-rational, ie., is empiric: it is irrational. 
The question remains that what can guarantee the functioning of the legislator's and 
the law-applier's decision if at the passing of judgment neither law-creation nor law-appli-
cation has at its disposal an exact mode of evidence. Or put it differently, what is the admis-
sible margin of error in these cases? 
A realistic answer is that it is society's recipiency at a given or concrete time-space di-
mension, or the credibility of the law-creator's and the law-applier's act. Credibility usually 
comes about not through the persuasive force of some kind of absolute and logically sound 
deduction. A ruling may meet a general social acceptance even on purely emotional grounds. 
38 See J. Parain-Viah Note sur l'épistémologie des concepts juridiques. Archives de Philosop-
hie du Droit. 1959. p. 132. 
38 Compare S. Ritterman: Méthode de la formation des notions dans la systématique du droit 
positif, notamment du droit civil. Archivum Juridicum Cracoviense, 1968. Vol. 1. pp. 116—118. 
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The basis of credibility may be varied, and may change in a variety of ways. This may be 
rationality, a correspondence with diverse principles and ideas, the manner of decision-ma-
king, confidence in the correctness or necessity of the procedure, belief, recognition of autho-
rity, feeling of intimidation, defencelessness, coercion, terror and so on. Credibility cannot 
be traced back always to the same cause, or the same type of group of causes. 
In other words: the functioning capacity of the legal norm relies upon its credibility 
as a legal norm. Essentially, this is on the one hand the assumption that the legal norm con-
tains a satisfactory, acceptable rule, and on the other that in case of a violation of the rule 
the law-applying bodies will indeed take measures against anyone who fails to observe the 
rule. The functioning capacity of the legal norm, therefore, lies in its usability as a motivational 
technique and the coercive acts of the official jurisdiction. The technology of functioning 
is thus a unity of persuasion and coercion, ie., the combination of two kinds of technique. 
This unity is not a theoretical question, but in full measure a pragmatic one, which 
can be resolved only in a concrete situation. The situation is unique and irreproducible. 
Only similar situations can arise, and not identical ones. Because behavior — be it action 
or non-action — can invariably be enacted in time and space, and thus it is irreversible. 
The concrete judging of a concrete behavior is bound by the time-space dimension: so 
this too is unique, unrepeatable and irreversible as a process. The law as a norm endea-
vors to break through this artifically, eg., with its temporal force, nullity, rehabilitation, 
fiction, presumption and with other similar things. These are specific legal-technical re-
solutions. These may also be grasped as techniques which enable the flexible treatment 
of the admissible margin of error. 
The functioning capacity of the judge's rule or the law-applier's decision essentially 
hinges on its enforceability. It may, of course, have a logical and emotional persuasive force 
or acceptability on rational grounds, yet its characteristic feature lies elsewhere. When a 
sentence of a judge has been passed, the subject of law is left without any real choice what-
soever. He has at best a chance that the decision cannot be executed for some reason. Usual-
ly, the number of inexecutable cases is an indicator not only of the disorders of jurisdic-
tion but also those of law-marking. 
The convincing interpretation — that is, one eliciting credibility — of the law-maker's 
and the law-applier's decision is not the same in these two fields. A sentence of the court 
can be satisfactorily accounted for by a legal norm, whereas in most cases a bill is not to be 
justified by referring to a judgment. These are not identical techniques. It is a moot point 
what is implied in a technical sense. The question is, then, what is the legislator's and the 
law-applier's act in general or in the abstract? 
4. Law as a Command 
For the pure theory of law the question is, what is the legal nor ml According to one 
of its crucial answers to this question, the legal norm is a "Sollen". For the technical theory 
of law the question is, what is the legal act? One of its crucial answers to this question: the 
legal act is a fact. 
The solution of the pure theory of law could involve that the legal norm is some sort 
of will. The solution of the technical theory of jurisprudence could involve that the legal 
act is some sort of will-manifestation. Although in dissimilar dimensions, the implication 
is the same. However, this conclusion might lead us to a misunderstanding of either approach. 
The methodological basis in the pure theory of law is the consistent distinction of the 
"is" (Sein) and the "ought" (Sollen) propositions: without this — ie., without the "Sollen" 
nature of the norm — law cannot be postulated "purely". The methodological basis in the 
technical theory of jurisprudence is a disregard of interpreting the legal norm as "Sollen" 
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or "Sein", for if either interpretation is made absolute, the real legal operations are bound 
to be unexplainable. In certain respects the pure theory of law determines the essence of 
law in normativity, while the technical theory of law its capability for functioning. Voli-
tion is a factor in both concepts, but not a key factor by any means. 
The norm can be comprehended as a certain will, but the will is not necessarily a norm. 
Kelsen does not take it for granted that the will should have an exclusively "Sollen" char-
acter. Moreover, he does not preclude that the will may well have a "Sein" character in 
some relations; so he interpretes by this means the norm, and not the will. As far as its 
functioning is concerned, a "will" which, for instance, can be gathered from a legal rule is 
undoubtedly different from that which can be gathered from a court ruling of a concrete 
case, then from the act executing that ruling. Volition resides also in people's behavior, 
yet it should not be taken into account either as a norm-generating or as a norm-applying 
will; these are, so to speak, not of a command nature. 
The originator of the "command theory of law" is Jeremy Bentham.i0 He held that all 
law could be analytically reduced to a "logic of the will", in which every human conduct 
could be seen either as commanded or prohibited, or not commanded or not prohibited, 
by the law. Where a human act was commanded or prohibited, it was the subject of a legal 
duty. 
The most successful classic of the command theory of law is John Austin. Austin defines 
law as "rule", and "rule" as "command". He says, "Every law or rule (taken with the larg-
est signification which can be given to the term properly) is a command. Or, rather, laws 
or rules, properly so called, are a species of commands."41 
A command is the expression of the will of an individual directed to the conduct of 
another individual — Kelsen wrote.42 A command consists of two elements: a wish directed 
towards someone else's behavior, and its expression in one way or another. There is a com-
mand only so long as both the will and its expression are present. If someone issues a com-
mand to me, and before its execution I have adequate reason to assume that it is no longer 
his will, then neither is it any longer a command, even though the expression of his will 
should remain.43 
Austin says, now where it obliges generally to acts or forbearances of a class, a com-
mand is a law or rule. But where it obliges to a specific act or forbearance, or to acts or 
forbearances which it determines specifically or individually, a command is occasional or 
particular.44 
A so-called "binding" command — Kelsen argues — is said to persist even if the will, 
the psychic phenomenon, has lapsed. More accurately, however, that which persists is not 
really the command, but rather my obligation. Hence legal rules, which according to Austin 
constitute the law, are not actually commands. Legal rules exist, that is to say, they are 
valid and obligate individuals, even if the will by which they were created has long ceased 
to be. It may even be said to be doubtful whether some instances in which legal obligations 
exist as to certain behavior even represented the real will of anyone.45 
The critique of the "law as command" propounded by Kelsen continues here, remark-
ably enough, not with a scrutiny of those tenets of Austin's which are dubitable on norma-
40 J. Bentham: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Burns and Hart 
ed. Of Laws in General. 1970. 41 J. Austin: The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, p. 13. 
42 H. Kelsen: The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, p. 272. 
43 H. Kelsen : ibid. p. 272. 
44 J. Austin: ibid. p. 19. 
45 H. Kelsen: ibid. p. 272. 
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tivistic grounds (declarative laws, imperfect laws, repealing laws and maybe dispositive laws). 
Kelsen employs this time a realistic technical argumentation: 
"The statute is enacted when a majority of the legislators have voted for a bill submitted 
to them. The content of the statute is not the "will" of the legislators who vote against the 
bill; their will is expressly contrary. Yet their expressions of will are just as essential to the 
•existence of the satute as are the expressions of will of the members who voted for it. The 
statute is an enactment of the whole legislature, including the minority, but this obviously 
does not mean that its content is the will — in the psychological sense — of all the members 
of the legislature.... And it is indubitable that in very many if not all senses, a large proportion 
•of the members of a legislature who vote for a bill either do not know its content or know 
it very superficially. That a legislator raises his hand or says "Aye" when the vote is being 
taken does not mean that he has made the content of the bill the content of his own will, 
in the way in which a man who "commands" another to act in a certain way "wills" this 
conduct."46 
Conclusion of Kelsen is the following: If a particular law is called a command, or 
"will" of the legislator, or if law is called the "command" or "will" of the "state", this can 
be taken as only a figurative expression. Law might be termed a "depsychologized" command. 
But a comparison of the "ought" of the norm with a command is apt only to a very slight 
•extent. The law enacted by the legislator is a "command" only if it is assumed that this 
-command has binding force. A command which has binding force is, indeed, a norm, But 
without the concept of the norm, the law can be described only with the help of a fiction, 
and Austin's assertion that legal rules are "commands" is a superflous and dangerous fic-
tion of the "will" of the legislator or the state.47 
It is evident also to the technical interpretation of law that the legal norm as rule is 
a depsychologized will. But if we consider the actually proceeding enactment of the law, or 
the actual passing of the court ruling, or the people's behavior of legal relevance, it is plain 
that the psychological will is present in these as well. We do not claim it is the essence of 
the operations, but its presence cannot be contested. 
Admittedly, without the concept of norm the law can be described only with the aid 
of fiction. The question remains, however, whether in the various theories of law — the 
pure theory of law included — the concept of law is not a fiction. Or, put differently: are 
the various theories of law all-inclusive or do they present only a certain range of interpre-
tation of the concept of law? In pragmatic terms, law is a norm which functions as law. 
If we expose the technique of functioning from this, we might arrive at a kind of range of 
interpretation. This, however, precisely because it is a technique, may be composed of ele-
ments brought from elsewhere yet assembled purposefully. 
According to its actual functioning, law can be interpreted as a general, indirect tech-
nique of motivation of a central (state) administration. The motivational planes of this — and 
the technology pertaining to each — are different.48 
A legal norm as law in force enacted by legislators in its functioning does not really 
•concur with that applied by courts and other jurisdictional bodies as a legal rule. Moreover, 
it is different what people practically think to be a legal rule and the way they behave in 
•compliance with that rule. And a rule is that which functions as one. Therefore, the concept 
-of law changes actually according to the planes of legal motivation; though mostly similar, 
these concepts are still not identical. 
46 H. Kelsen: ibid. p. 273. 
47 H. Kelsen: ibid p. 274. 
48 Gy. Antalffy—A. Tamás : ibid. pp. 28—32. 
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Law consists of rules binding on everyone in principle, irrespective of the fact that the 
content of these rules is represented by the various motivational planes in various ways. 
That some rule is universally binding is a principle only. That some rule functions in reality 
as though universally binding is a fact. Of all those affected by the rule, the rule is practically 
obligatory on those who accept it, or those who are forced by coercion to observe that rule. 
The principle's turning into fact is promoted by persuasion and coercion. 
In the legal norm, the element of coercion is the sanction. Institutionalized and regular 
coercion is realized by the jurisdictional functioning of the courts and other law-applying 
organs. With this, however, the element of coercion in law has not been exhausted. Just as 
the technical planes or levels of legal motivation differ from each other, each with a practical 
concept of law of its own, in like manner each of these levels has a coercive technique. 
On the basis of the mechanics of functioning the question cannot be simplified by 
saying that the legal norm is a command, or is not a command. 
The legal norm can indeed be interpreted for the legislator as a command, but there is 
not much benefit in this. Usually, in the norm the legislator gives a command not to himself, 
but to others. Although the enacted legal rule is binding on the legislator — thus far it is a 
"command" for him too — but he can modify it any time, that is, he can "repeal the com-
mand". The legislator — especially in the modern political state where the state executive 
has also legislative power49 — decides himself in a technical sense whether to make a legisla-
tive or operative decision for the solution of a task. For in most cases an operative decision 
can be made in the form of a norm, and instead of norm-creation it is technically feasible 
to produce a sequence of operative decisions: the operative can be described as normative 
and the normative can be described as operative. The operative decision is by no means a 
command for the decision-maker — still it can be a precedent, a frame of reference even 
against the decision-maker as well. 
The legal norm for the court and the jurisdictional bodies in general is a command inas-
much as they are obliged to apply the legal norms. The cases in which the courts and other 
law-applying organs take measures are typically those in which the "command" of the norm 
is addressed not to them but to their clients. The law-applier cannot alter the legal rule;, 
he is not to repeal or modify the "command" of the legislator. In the course of his decision-
making procedure, by contrast, he is free to interpret the legal norms with a relatively broad 
margin: thus the binding force of the norm is relative. 
The legal norm for the citizens and subjects of law is a command inasmuch as they are, 
or can be, responsible for a certain behavior. If the subject of law does not deem this oblig-
atory on himself, and he is not forced by the courts or the jurisdictional bodies to comply, 
then there is no real obligation. The citizen, or the subject of law is not to change the legar 
norm. If the legal norm is not observed, it cannot persist for long even with the coercive 
force of jurisdiction; this, however, applies not to an occasional case but to a massive number 
of phenomena, with the concomitant loss of both the legal norm's and the jurisdictional 
bodies' credibility. The legal norm is known to the subject on his own motivational plane 
and he judges it accordingly. The norm in this sense is not a command either, only a motiv-
ation heightened by coercion. 
As opposed to this, the court ruling and the jurisdictional decision is a legal command 
for the one who is obligated by it. In this sense it is a command for others too: a judgment-
at-law — apart from exceptional cases — is not to be altered by either the same or another 
court, either the legislator or the citizens. It is for one single case, and is valid definitively. 
48 Compare, for example, J. K. Conant: In the Shadow of Wilson and Brownlow: Executive 
Branch Reorganization in the States, 1965 to 1987. Public Administration Review, 1988. 5. pp. 
896—897. 
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The court ruling and the jurisdictional decision is a real legal command, and not a norm, 
even if the ratio dicendi expounded apropos the concrete case may serve as an example for 
the interpretation of law. 
Finally, the generally accepted law — ie., the tendency by which the legal norm as law 
in force enacted by legislators manifests itself in the behavior of subjects of law, the way 
people know and accept law — is not a command but a behavior pattern. The saying "be-
have as everyone does in similar situations" is more than a simple behavior-pattern. A beha-
vior contrary to this motivation and behavior-pattern will lead to enforcing one's rights before 
the authorities: to suing someone, to reporting someone, to taking an action against someone, 
to cooperating with the law-enforcing authorities, etc. There is stimulation, or even coercion 
in this motivational field, too, but this is no command. 
By way of conclusion it must be indicated that the violation of law is not a denial of 
command in either the pure theory of law or the technical theory of law. Concerning the 
disobedience of the subject of law, Prof. John Rawls thinks that in a just society one has to 
accept even the unjust rules, provided they do not transcend a certain limit of justness.50 
The discussion of the problem lies in the sphere of the questions of freedom and righteous-
ness, ie., in dimensions far removed from the validity of law or the functioning capacity of 
law. In Rawls' view the denial of a command depends on the justness of the command. 
The theoretical argumentation is imposing as well as engaging, yet not very convincing. 
On the one hand, it is not convincing that, in the case of an unjust regime, can the disobe-
dience to law be interpreted as a denial of command? If the law is not a command, then 
the unjust law is not a command either. It is at best that a deliberate disregard for the exe-
cution of a judgment — at-law or a jurisdictional decision is a denial of legal command on the 
part of the obligant. On the. other hand, Prof. Rawls arguments reveal that he performed 
an analysis of the problematics of command-denial from the perspective of philosophy — 
with no regard to any technological methods or their possible or impossible applicability. 
This latter aspect is somewhat beyond the scope of our discussion, we should still remark 
that the problem is not a purely philosophical-theoretical aspect at all, but much rather a 
realistic one. The Europe of our century is far too experienced as far as modern dictator-
ships are concerned, aware even of the fact that the fundaments of a totalitarian system are 
by no means the legal considerations and, conversely, there are no absolute legal guarantees 
for precluding it. A dictatorship is not brought about by law, nor is toppled by it, although 
it does have a role in both. Without expounding the argument: law is not a command in 
this sense either. 
50 J. Rawls: A Theory of Justice. Oxford, 1972. p. 351. 
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